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Abstract 
Over-the-counter derivatives have contributed significantly to the effectiveness 
and efficiency of the international financial system but also entail significant counterparty 
credit risk. Collateralization is one of the most important and widespread credit risk 
mitigation techniques used in derivatives transactions. However, the relevant decisions 
are often made in an ad-hoc manner, without reference to an analytical framework. Very 
little academic research has addressed the quantitative analysis of collateralization for 
contingent credit risk control. The issue of mark-to-market timing becomes important for 
reducing credit exposure of illiquid and long term derivatives contracts due to the 
difficulty and cost of marking to market. The goal of this research is to propose a 
framework for minimizing the potential credit exposure of collateralized derivatives 
transactions by optimizing mark-to-market timing. 
 
 
1.  Introduction 
OTC derivatives markets have grown exponentially since its introduction in 1980s. 
The notional amounts of interest rate and currency swaps and interest rate options 
increased from $865 billion in 1987 to $183 trillion in 2004 and the outstanding notional 
amount of all OTC derivatives totaled $220 trillion in 2004 (BIS,2004). The rapid growth 
of OTC derivatives has contributed significantly to the effectiveness and efficiency of the 
international financial system. OTC derivatives are efficient way to transfer risk and 
promote optimal risk allocation among agents with different risk tolerance. However, 
market participants of derivatives transactions faces significant counterparty credit risks, 
the counterparty may fail to perform on its contingent obligations that are variable and 
market driven.  
The essential underpinning of contingent credit risk management is a meaningful 
measurement of credit exposure, which is mainly composed of potential credit exposure, 
a credit risk concept largely unique to OTC derivatives transactions. Potential credit 
exposure is the amount that one would lose if counterparty default at some future date. 
The accurate assessment of potential credit exposure is difficult and of great interest to 
market participants and regulators. This issue becomes more complicated with the rapidly 
increasing use of collateralization that has proved to be able to significantly reduce credit 
risk.  Collateralization is the most important and widely used methods in practice to 
mitigate counterparty credit risk.  In a typical collateral arrangement, the secured 
obligation is periodically marked-to-market and the collateral is adjusted to reflect 
     
changes in value. The securing party posts additional collateral when the market value 
has risen, or removes collateral when it has fallen. How to effective measure potential 
credit exposure of the collateralized portfolio is of significant importance for a wide 
range of credit risk management applications in derivatives transaction such as capital 
adequacy, credit limit setting and monitoring etc.  
There are three components in credit risk measurement of a financial asset: the 
probability of default (PD), loss given default (LGD, defined as one minus recovery rate 
RR), and exposure at default (EAD).  While academic literature has focused on the issue 
of default probabilities and recover rate for pricing credit risk, EAD has been taken for 
given and lightly touched by the academic models. EAD of loan transactions is typically 
treated as the book value of assets plus contributions from undrawn credit lines that are 
calibrated as expectation values by regulatory and propriety models. However, the credit 
exposure of OTC derivatives transaction is volatile and market driven and the accurate 
measurement of credit exposure (especially potential credit exposure) is the center feature 
of effective counterparty risk management. On the other hand, although collateralization 
has been widely used in practice for reducing credit risk, its impact on credit risk is 
lightly touched and mainly indirectly studied via its effect on recovery rate and little 
research exists on how the collateralization affects credit risk exposure and how to 
determine the major parameters of collateral agreement (such as haircut and margin calls) 
notwithstanding their importance in practice. Margrabe (1978) mentions the similarity 
between an exchange option and a margin account and provides the pricing for a very 
simple marking-to-market. Stulz and Johnson (1985) study the impact of collateralization 
on the pricing of secured debt using contingent claim analysis. Jokivuolle and Peura 
(2000) present a model of collateral haircut determination for bank loans. Their model is 
geared to providing adequate long-to-value ratios, which is similar to the concept of 
haircut, using a structural credit risk approach. Jokivuolle and Peura (2003) present a 
model of risky debt in which collateral value is correlated with the possibility of default. 
The model is then used to study the expected loss given default, primarily as a function of 
collateral.  Aparicio, Felipe M. and Didier Cossin (2003) develop stylized programs 
providing parties exposed to credit risk with optimal timing and optimal size of the 
controls required on the collateral they secure, in cases of both complete and partial 
observation. Cossin and Hricko (2003) present a methodology for haircut determination 
also using a structural approach but with the final objective of pricing a credit risk 
instrument backed with collateral. Johannes and Sundaresan (2003) analyze the role of 
collateral in determining market swap rates. They proved a theory of swap valuation 
under collateralization and found evidence supporting the presence of costly collateral. 
They also estimate a terms structure model to characterize the cost of collateral and 
quantify its effect on swap rates. Cossin and Huang (2003) build a general framework for 
risk control determination of collateral used in repurchase agreements or repos. They 
derive how a collateral taker should build collateral policies (i.e. haircut schedules) for 
the collateral policy to be consistent.    
Although marking-to-market secured obligations more frequently has the benefit 
of reducing the potential exposure, it also incurs substantial operational expenses and the 
information cost of releasing positions to other dealers, especially for illiquid contract 
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with long maturity. For illiquid OTC derivatives transactions, it is difficult and/or 
expensive to mark to market the derivatives contracts and collateral held. When the 
frequency of mark-to-market is constrained, the timing of MTM can provide another way 
to reduce potential exposure and become important for mitigating credit risk. While the 
issue of the frequency of mark-to-market and collateral level (Cossin, 2002, 2003) has 
been studied, no academic research has addressed the quantitative analysis of MTM 
timing in counterparty potential credit exposure. The goal of this research is to fill in this 
theoretical gap by providing a general framework that would help evaluate the effect of 
MTM timing on potential credit exposure of a portfolio. The results of this study have 
strong implications for academics and practitioners involved in the counterparty risk 
management of OTC derivatives. The metric of potential credit exposure used in this 
paper is potential future exposure (PFE), the quantile of maximum credit exposure of all 
the potential price paths over a specified time interval (such as the lifetime of the contract) 
at a certain confidence level (95%, 99% etc.). PFE can provide information of worst case 
over the entire life of a transaction or portfolio. It is a probabilistic metric of future 
exposure and provides a more accurate and robust analytical metric compared to other 
metrics like peak exposure or expected exposure.   
Dealers in derivatives transactions have a portfolio of counterparties (the firm’s 
portfolio), with each of whom the dealer have a portfolio of derivatives contracts (the 
counterparty’s portfolio). The analysis of potential credit exposure is conducted at three 
levels of individual transaction, of counterparty and of the firm’s portfolio. This paper 
treats the general case of a single collateralized contract. The simplified case of a single 
MTM policy is studied and then twice MTM policy are examined. Future research will 
examine the MTM timing issue for the potential credit exposure at the counterparty level 
and the firm’s portfolio.  
This paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we develop the model for single 
MTM policy and present the numerical results. Section 3 builds the model for twice 
MTM and displays the numerical results. Section 4 concludes.    
2 Single Mark-to-market Model 
2.1 Set-up 
This section treats the general case of an individual transaction with unilateral 
collateral agreement and single marking to market opportunity during the lifetime of the 
collateralized contract.  The decision of optimal MTM timing is modeled as a non-linear 
optimization problem based on the following assumptions: 
(1) The contract has a maturity of T (1, 2, 5 years etc.); the market value of the 
contract,  and , follows driftless Brownian motion, tV ],0[ Tt ∈ ),0( σBM ; the initial 
market value for the collateral taker is nonnegative, . 00 ≥V
(2) At contract initiation, the counterparty is required to post a certain amount of 
collateral ( , initial margin), which is calculated as a pre-specified percentage (0C β ) of 
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initial contract value, 00 VC β= . The time to maturity of the collateral is greater than the 
expiration date of the underlying contract.  The market value of collateral ( ) is constant 
(non-stochastic collateral, i.e. cash).  
tC
(3) There is only one marking to market during the lifetime of the contract; there 
are constant time intervals between candidate MTM days; that is, 1,...,2,1 −= Tτ . On the 
pre-specified MTM day (τ ), if the MTM value of the contract exceeds the trigger level, a 
specified percentage of initial market value of contract ( 0Cα ), a margin call happens and 
the counterparty is required to deposit more collateral such that the amount of collateral is 
brought up to a new level as a percentage of MTM value, that is 
If 0CV ατ > , then ττ βVC =  where ( )T,0∈τ  
If the MTM value of the contract stays below trigger level, no margin call 
happens and the collateral remain the same as initial margin, that is,  
If 0CV ατ ≤ , then 00 VCC βτ ==  where ( )T,0∈τ  
(4) The maximum credit exposure of the collateralized contract during its lifetime 
under a specified MTM policy ( ) is the maximum amount of the market value of the 
contract above collateral held during the contract’s lifetime. Because the collateral after 
MTM day may be different than the initial margin,  is the greater of the maximum 
credit exposures before MTM day ( ) and that after MTM day ( ). That is,   
τE
τE
1E 2E{ } { } { }τττττ CVCVCVCVEEE BAsTsss −−=−−== ∈∈ ,maxmax,maxmax,max 0],[0],0[21  
where  is the maximum market value of the contract from the 
contract initiation until MTM day (
[ ] ssA VV τ,0max∈= [ ]τ,0 ), which is unobservable but the distribution can 
be estimated;  
[ ] sTsB VV ,maxτ∈=  is the maximum market value of the contract from MTM day until 
maturity ( [ ]T,τ ), which is unobservable but the distribution can be estimated;  
AV  and  are independent conditional on  according to the Markov property 
of Brownian motion.  
BV τV
           (5) Potential Future Exposure (PFE) is the metric for measuring the potential 
credit exposure of derivatives transactions. PFE of a collateralized contract is the 
maximum credit exposure of the collateralized contract expected to occur at a specific 
confidence level (95%, 99% etc.) over a certain time period (the lifetime of the contract).  
Based on the above assumptions, the optimal MTM timing decision is modeled as 
a nonlinear optimization problem with explicit consideration of the stochastic path 
properties as below: 
( )
{ }1,...,2,1              
0                 
,    ..
      
−∈
>
=
T
y
qyfts
yMin
τ
τ
τ
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 Where ( ) ( yEyfq >== τ )τ Pr,  is the probability that , the maximum credit 
exposure of a collateralized contract during its lifetime for a given MTM timing policy 
exceeds a specified risk appetite (a certain level of PFE). The objective function is to 
minimize PFE at a specified level of confidence level (
τE
q−1 ).Decision variable is MTM 
time (τ ) that can take discrete value among available MTM days between which are 
constant time intervals.   
The function of the probability ( q ) with regard to MTM time (τ ) and PFE ( y ) is 
constructed in the following section. Numerical methods are then used to find the optimal 
solution of MTM timing (τ ) and the corresponding optimal PFE. 
2.2 Model                                                                                                  
This section develops the function of the probability q  with regard to MTM 
timeτ , risk appetite  (a specific level of PFE given the volatility rate of the contract) 
and the parameters of the collateral agreement (
y
α , β ). The market value of the contract 
is observable only at the initiation, maturity and MTM day ( Tt ,,0 τ= ). The collateral 
after the MTM day is decided by the occurrence of a margin call on that day with regard 
to the MTM value of the contract ( ).  Two market scenarios depends on : (1) 
Scenario 1 that  no margin call happens on MTM day if 
τV τV
0CV ατ ≤ ; and (2) Scenario 2 
that a margin call happens on MTM day if 0CV ατ > . Correspondingly, the probability 
( ) is computed in two parts with regard to the occurrence of a margin call on the future 
MTM day.  
q
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Where 
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Equation 2.2 calculates the probability of margin call not triggered the MTM 
value of the contract on MTM day is below the trigger level, that is 0CV ατ ≤ .  The 
MTM value of the contract ( ) follows a normal distribution with mean of 0 and 
variance of , that is 
τV
τσ 2 ( )τστ 2,0~ NV .  
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Equation 2.3 computes the probability of the maximum credit exposure before 
MTM timing below the risk appetite under scenario 1.  The distribution of , the 
maximum market value of the contract from the contract initiation until MTM day, 
conditional on the MTM value of the contract on MTM day 
AV
( )0CxV ατ ≤=   can be 
estimated using the distribution of the maximum of a Brownian Bridge with given 
starting and ending values . The proof sees Appendix A.  ( xV ,0 )
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Equation 2.4 computes the probability that maximum credit exposure after MTM 
day until maturity stays below risk appetite with no margin call on MTM day. The market 
value of the contract during [ ]T,τ follows Brownian motion  starting from . 
Using reflection principle of Brownian motion, we can easily derive the conditional 
probability of   given . 
),0( 2σBM τV
BV τV
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Equation 2.5 computes the probability of maximum credit exposure from the 
contract initiation to MTM day below the risk appetite with margin call on MTM day. 
The derivation of the conditional distribution of  conditional on characterized by 
Brownian Bridge sees the Appendix.  
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Equation 2.6 computes the probability of maximum credit exposure after MTM 
day until maturity below risk appetite with margin call on MTM day. 
2.3 Numerical Examples    
After the construction of the function of the probability with regard to risk 
appetite and MTM time and the parameters, this section gives numerical examples and 
uses numerical methods to solve the optimal MTM time for minimizing PFE.  
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The benchmark case uses the following values of the main parameters in this 
model, 2.0,24,1,1.1,9.0,05.0 0 ====== σβα TVq . This case studies the optimal 
MTM time to minimize PFE at 95% confidence level, starting with the market value of 
the underlying contract ( ) at initiation is $1 million, when the collateral pledged is 
110% of . On MTM day, if market value of the underlying contract exceeds 90% of 
collateral pledged, margin call is triggered and the counterparty is asked to pose 
additional collateral such that the new collateral is 110% of the observed MTM value of 
the underlying contract; otherwise, no margin call is triggered and no action is needed. 
The market value of the underlying contract follows driftless Brownian motion with 
monthly volatility 20%.  Figure 2.1 displays that there exist optimal time of marking to 
market for minimizing PFE and the approximate optimal solution is around 10
0V
0V
th month 
for the contract with a maturity of 24 months. 
 
1.2
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1.5
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1.7
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1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23
MTM time
PF
E
 
                                      Figure 2.1 PFE w.r.t MTM time for the benchmark case 
 
Figure 2.2 presents the pattern of the probability q  with regard to PFE and MTM 
day (τ ) for contract with different volatilities using the analytic formula for a contract of 
24 months maturity. Figure 2.3 displays the results using Monte Carlo Simulation 
methods.  
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Figure 2.2 Numerical examples with maturity of 24 months 
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Figure 2.3 Simulation of q w.r.t PFE and MTM time with maturity of 24 months 
 
 9
     
With the base case as a benchmark, the effect on optimal MTM timing and 
minimum PFE of changing the values of the different parameters of the models is 
investigated.  
 
(1) Changes inT  (maturity of the underlying contract) 
T MTM TIME PFE 
12 5 0.9325 
24 10 1.3602 
36 15 1.6884 
As expected, the longer the time to maturity of the underlying contract, the higher 
the PFE.  The optimal MTM time is around the half way (0.4166) of the maturity.  
 
(2) Change in q (the probability of the maximum credit exposure above risk appetite) 
Q MTM TIME PFE 
0.1 9 1.1515 
0.05 10 1.3602 
0.01 11 1.7697 
Also as expected, the smaller the confidence level, the higher the PFE. The 
optimal MTM time is closer to the maturity.  
 
(3) Change in σ  (the monthly volatility of the underlying contract) 
σ  MTM TIME PFE 
0.1 10 0.4163 
0.2 10 1.3602 
0.3 10 2.0903 
The higher the volatility of the underlying contract, the higher PFE; however, the 
optimal MTM time is not affected by the volatility.   
 
(4) Change in  (initial contract value) 0V
V0 MTM TIME PFE 
0 10 1.4602 
0.5 10 1.4102 
1 10 1.3602 
1.5 10 1.3102 
2 10 1.2603 
The higher the initial contract value, the smaller PFE; the optimal MTM time 
remains the same for different initial contract value. 
 
(5) Change in α  (the multiplier for trigger level of margin call) 
α  MTM TIME PFE 
0.5 11 1.3966 
0.8 10 1.3613 
0.9 10 1.3602 
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1 10 1.3636 
There is a value of alpha with which PFE is minimal.  
 
(6) Change in β  (multiplier for computing required collateral)  
BETA MTM TIME PFE 
1 10 1.4817 
1.1 10 1.3602 
1.5 10 0.9703 
1.7 11 0.8321 
1.9 12 0.7026 
2 13 0.6364 
As expected, the higher the required collateral level, the smaller the PFE. With the 
increase of β , the optimal MTM time moves closer the maturity.  
3 Optimal Timing Analysis of Twice Mark-to-market Policy 
This section extends to the twice MTM policy where the timing decision is made 
simultaneously at the contract initiation or in a sequential manner. Under the 
simultaneous decision scheme, the collateral taker decides at the contract initiation the 
two days when to mark the contract to the market; while under the sequential decision 
scheme, the collateral taker decides the first MTM time at the beginning of the contract 
and set the second MTM time on the first day when the contract is marked to market  
3.1 Twice MTM of Simultaneous Timing Decision 
This section treats the general case of an individual transaction with unilateral 
collateral agreement under twice MTM policy with simultaneous timing decision. The 
assumptions are the same as those for single MTM policy except that there are two 
marking to market opportunities during the lifetime of the contract.  
The collateral taker needs to decide the two MTM days ( )21,ττ  at the beginning 
of the contract; there are constant time intervals between candidate MTM days; that is, { }1,...,2,11 −∈ Tτ  and { 1,...,2,112 }−+∈ Tττ . On the first pre-specified MTM day ( )1τ , if 
the market value of the contract exceeds the trigger level which is set by a percentage ( )α  
of collateral posted, a margin call happens and the counterparty will be required to 
deposit more collateral; otherwise, no more collateral is required. That is,  
⎩⎨
⎧=
1
0
1 V
V
C β
β
   if      
01
01
CV
CV
α
α
>
≤
where  is the market value of the underlying contract at 1V 1τ  
On the second pre-decided MTM day ( )2τ , if the market value of the underlying 
contract exceeds the trigger level which is set by a multiple of collateral posted, a margin 
call happens and the counterparty will be required to deposit more collateral; otherwise, 
no more collateral is required. That is  
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where  is the market value of the underlying contract at 2V 2τ . 
Under a given MTM policy with specified MTM days ( )21,ττ , the maximum 
credit exposure of a collateralized contract during its lifetime is the maximum amount of 
the market value of the contract above collateral held. Because the collateral after MTM 
day may be different than that before the MTM day and there are two MTM days,   is 
the greatest of the maximum credit exposures between the contract initiation and the first 
MTM day ( ), the maximum credit exposure between the first and the second MTM 
day ( ) and the maximum credit exposure after the second MTM day until maturity 
( ).  
τE
1E
2E
3E { 321 ,,max EEEE =τ } , where  and is the maximum credit exposure 
during time periods [ ] 21
, EE 3E
1,0 τ  , [ ]21,ττ  and [ ]T,2τ  respectively.  
00],0[1 1
max CVCVE Ass −=−= ∈ τ , where  is the maximum market value of the 
underlying contract during  
AV
[ ]1,0 τ  
11],[2 21
max CVCVE Bss −=−= ∈ ττ   , where   is the maximum market value of the 
underlying contract during 
BV
[ ]21,ττ  
22],[3 2
max CVCVE CsTs −=−= ∈ τ , where   is the maximum market value of the 
underlying contract during 
CV
[ ]T,2τ  
The twice MTM time decision is models as nonlinear optimization problem with 
explicit consideration of the stochastic path properties: 
( )
{ }
{ }1,...,2,1                 
2,...,2,1                 
0                 
,    ..
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qyfts
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              (3.1) 
 Where ( ) ( )yEyfq >== ττ Pr,  is the probability that maximum credit 
exposure of the collateralized contract during its lifetime exceeds the risk appetite (a 
specific value of the PFE). 
The objective function is to minimize PFE at a specified level of confidence level 
( ), 95%, 99% etc. The decision variable is MTM time q−1 ( )21,ττ   that can take discrete 
values from available MTM days between which are constant time intervals.       
The framework first derives the function of the probability ( ) with regard to 
MTM time (
q
τ ) and PFE ( ) and then uses numerical methods to identify the optimal y
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MTM timing solution and the corresponding optimal PFE that will be compared to those 
of sequential timing decision.                                                                                
The probability is computed in four parts corresponding to four scenarios of the 
likelihood of margin calls on the two pre-specified MTM days:  
(1) No margin call happens on either of the two MTM days if 01 CV α≤  
and 12 CV α≤ , where 0012 VCCC β=== . 
(2) No margin call happens on first MTM day but a margin call happens on 
second MTM day if 01 CV α≤  and 12 CV α> , where 001 VCC β==  and 12 VC β= .  
 (3) A margin call happens on first MTM day but no margin call happens on 
second MTM day if 01 CV α>  and 12 CV α≤ , where 11 VC β=  and 112 VCC β== . 
(4) A margin call happens on both MTM days if 01 CV α>  and 12 CV α> , where 
11 VC β=  and 22 VC β= .  
3.2 Twice Mark-to-market with sequential timing decision                                                                           
This section treats the general case of an individual transaction with unilateral 
collateral agreement under twice MTM policy with sequential timing decision.  The 
assumptions are the same as the single MTM model except that there are two MTM 
opportunities during the lifetime of the contract.  
The PFE before the first MTM day is equal to the greater of the quantile (risk 
appetite) at a confidence level of ( )q−1  and zero; 
( ){ }0,,,max 11 τxqfy AA −=   
and 
   
( ) (
( )xVyCV
xVyCV
xVyExyfq
AA
Ass
AAAA
=>−=
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ =>−=
=>==
∈
10
10],0[
11
|Pr
|maxPr
|Pr,,
1τ
τ )
Aq  is the conditional probability that  (the maximum credit exposure between 
the contract initiation and the first MTM day 
AE [ ]`,0 τ ) exceeds a risk appetite given the 
MTM value of the contract; and 
],0[ 1
max
τ∈
=
s
sA VV  is the maximum market value of the 
contract between the contract initiation and the first MTM day, whose value is 
unobservable but distribution can be estimated.  
The PFE after the first MTM day ( ) is the minimal PFE calculated using single 
MTM timing decision model with initial contract value  , the initial margin of , the 
maturity of 
By
1V 1C
1τ−T  and the same margin call policy set before.  
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Bq  is the conditional probability that  (the maximum credit exposure of the 
collateralized contract between the first MTM day and the maturity day
BE [ T,` ]τ ) exceeds a 
risk appetite given the MTM value of the contract on first MTM day ( ;  is the 
greater of the maximum credit exposure between the first and the second MTM day 
( ) and that between the second MTM day and the maturity day 
( );   is the maximum market value of the contract during [
)xV =1 BE
][ ]
1, 21
max CVss −∈ ττ
[ ] 2,2max CVsTs −∈τ BV 1,0 τ  and is 
the maximum market value of the contract during 
CV
[ ]T,2τ , both of which are unobservable 
but the distribution can be estimated.  
Based on the above assumptions, the sequential timing decision of twice MTM 
policy is models as two-stage stochastic dynamic programming problem.  
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yyy
ts
yMin
−+∈
=
−∈
=
ττ
τττ
τ
τ }                                                           (3.2) 
The objective function is to minimize the expected PFE over the distribution of 
the MTM value of the contract on the first MTM day. The PFE of contract during its 
lifetime conditional on the MTM value of the contract is the greater of the PFE before the 
MTM value and after the MTM value defined above. The function of the expected PFE 
with regard to the twice MTM time is developed and then numerical methods are used to 
find the optimal MTM days and the results are compared with the simultaneous timing 
decision.  
The expected PFE is computed based on the distribution of the MTM value of the 
contract on the first MTM day. The MTM value of the contract on the first MTM day ( ) 
follows a normal distribution with a mean of zero and a variance of , that 
is
1V
1
2τσ( )121 ,0~ τσNV .  defines two scenarios: (1) Scenarios 1 that no margin call happens 1V
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if 01 CV α≤ ; (2) Scenario 2 that a margin call may occur if 01 CV α> . The occurrence of a 
margin call on the first MTM day decides the collateral level for the second stage timing 
decision is dependent on; therefore, the expected value of PFE is computed in two parts 
with regard to .  1V
( )
{ } ( )
( ) ( )∫∫
∫
∫
∞
∞−
∞+
∞−
∞+
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⎟⎟⎠
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⎛ −−•+⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −−•=
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −−•=
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −−•=
0
0
1
2
2
0
2
11
2
2
0
1
1
1
2
2
0
1
1
2
2
0
1
2
exp
2
1
2
exp
2
1
2
exp,max
2
1
2
exp
2
1
C
C
BA
dx
Vx
ydx
Vx
y
dx
Vx
yy
dxVxyEy
α
α
τσσπττσσπτ
τσσπτ
τσσπτ
   (3.3) 
 
1y  is a specific value of the PFE of the collateralized contract during its lifetime 
under scenario 1 defined by 01 CxV α≤=  such that no margin call happens on the first 
MTM day ( 1τ ).It is the greater of the PFE between the contract initiation and the first 
MTM day ( [ ]1,0 τ ) and the PFE between the first MTM day and the maturity day ( [ ]T,1τ ). 
Thus, { }*,max 111 BA yyy =   
where  is the PFE during 1Ay [ ]1,0 τ  given 01 CxV α≤=  and  is the optimal PFE 
during [
1
By]T,1τ  given 01 CxV α≤=  solved by the single MTM timing decision model.  ( )11111 ,τAA qfy −=    
where ( ) ( )
( )
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ +++−+−=
≤=>−=
≤>==
1
2
000
2
0
010
011
1
1
1
2))((2)(2
exp
|Pr
|Pr,
τσ
α
ατ
xVVxCyCy
CxVyCV
CVyEyfq
A
AAA
                                      (3.4) 
1
Aq  describes the conditional probability of  (the maximum credit exposure of 
the collateralized contract during
AE[ ]1,0 τ ) exceeding the risk appetite given  01 CxV α≤=  . 
The conditional distribution of  given AE 01 CxV α≤=  is characterized by the 
distribution of the maximum of a Brownian Bridge with given beginning and ending 
value of ( . Numerical method is then used to find out  at a specific level of . )xV ,0 1Ay 1Aq
*1By  is the optimal PFE during [ ]T,1τ  under the optimal timing decision solved 
using single MTM timing model given  01 CxV α≤=  such that no margin call happens on 
the first MTM day.  
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112
1
1
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1
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 where   ( )
( )
{ }( )0121
01
21
1
1
1
|,maxPr
|Pr
,,
CVyCVCV
CVyE
Vygq
CB
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α
α
τ
≤>−−=
≤>=
=
  
 
2y  is a specific value of the PFE of the collateralized contract during its lifetime 
under scenario 2 defined by 01 CxV α>=  such that a margin call happens on the first 
MTM day. It is the greater of the PFE between the contract initiation and the first MTM 
day ( [ ]1,0 τ ) and the PFE between the first MTM day and the maturity day ( [ ]T,1τ ). Thus, { }*,max 222 BA yyy =  
where  is the PFE during 2Ay [ ]1,0 τ  given 01 CxV α>=  and  is the optimal PFE 
during [
2
By]T,1τ  given 01 CxV α>=  solved by the single MTM timing decision model.  ( )12122 ,τAA qfy −= ,   where ( ) ( )011222 |Pr, CVyEyfq AAA ατ >>==   
2
Aq  describes the conditional probability of   (the maximum credit exposure 
during 
AE[ 1,0 ]τ ) exceeding a risk appetite given  01 CxV α>=  . The conditional 
distribution of  given AE 01 CxV α≤=  is characterized by the distribution of the 
maximum of a Brownian Bridge with given beginning and ending value of . 
Numerical method is then used to find out  at a specific level of . 
( )xV ,0
2
Ay
2
Aq
*2By  is the optimal PFE during [ ]T,1τ  under the optimal timing decision solved 
using single MTM timing model given  01 CxV α>=  such that no margin call happens 
on the first MTM day.   
( )
{ }  1,...,2,1
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  ,,y      ..
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2
2
2
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2
2
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y
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                                                                        (3.6) 
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3.3 Numerical Results 
After the construction of the function of the probability under simultaneous and 
sequential timing decision with regard to risk appetite and MTM time and the parameters 
defining the contract value and collateralization, this section gives numerical examples 
and uses numerical methods to solve the optimal MTM time for minimizing PFE.  
The benchmark case uses the following values of the main parameters in this 
model: 1.0,12,1,1.1,9.0,05.0 0 ====== σβα TVq . This case studies the optimal  
time for making to market in order to minimize PFE at 95% confidence level, starting 
with the market value of the contract at initiation ( ) is $1 million, when the collateral 
pledged is 110% of . On the MTM days, if the market value of the contract exceeds 
90% of collateral pledged, margin call is triggered and the counterparty is asked to pose 
additional collateral such that the new collateral is 110% of the MTM value of the 
contract; otherwise, no margin call is triggered and no action is needed. The market value 
of the contract follows driftless Brownian motion with monthly volatility 10%.  Table 3.1 
compares the results of optimal MTM timing and the corresponding optimal PFE under 
single MTM policy, twice MTM with simultaneous timing decision and twice MTM with 
sequential timing decision schemes. It is shown that there exists optimal time of marking 
to markets for minimizing PFE under all the MTM policies.  The optimal PFE under 
twice MTM with sequential timing decision is minimal among the three MTM policies. 
The first MTM time under twice MTM policy is the same and earlier than the optimal 
MTM time under single MTM policy because of the existence of the second MTM 
opportunity.   
0V
0V
Table 3.1 Comparison of PFE with different time decisions 
Single MTM  Twice MTM (simultaneous) Twice MTM (sequential ) 
T PFE t1 t2 PFE t1 PFE 
1 0.5144 1 6 0.3726 1 0.3667 
2 0.4736 2 6 0.3443 2 0.3302 
3 0.4397 3 7 0.3252 3 0.2964 
4 0.4206 4 8 0.3189 4 0.2822 
5 0.4163 5 8 0.3191 5 0.2918 
6 0.4224 6 9 0.3272 6 0.3031 
7 0.4369 7 9 0.3443 7 0.3211 
8 0.4595 8 10 0.3666 8 0.3493 
9 0.4886 9 10 0.3938 9 0.3764 
10 0.5198 10 11 0.4202 10 0.402 
1.0,12,05.0 === σTq  
 
Figure 3.1 to 3.3 presents the PFE with respect to MTM time under three different 
marking to market policies for different maturities of the contract.  
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Figure 3.1 PFE w.r.t first MTM time with T=12 and 1.0=σ  
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Figure 3.2 PFE w.r.t first MTM time with T=24 and 1.0=σ  
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
1.1
1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25 27 29 31 33 35
MTM time
PF
E
 
Figure 3.3 PFE w.r.t first MTM time with T=36 and 1.0=σ  
 
As expected, twice MTM time decisions reduce PFE compared to single MTM 
time decision. And sequential MTM time decision does better in minimizing PFE than 
simultaneous decision because the sequential MTM timing utilize more information 
about market value than simultaneous decision. The optimal first MTM time under 
sequential time decisions is earlier than that under simultaneous time decisions when 
maturity increases.  The longer the lifetime of the underlying contract, the higher degree 
the sequential twice MTM time decision reduces PFE.   
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4 Conclusions 
In this paper, we have developed a general model of study the optimal marking to 
market timing in collateralization to minimize the potential future exposure of a single 
collateralized contract. The simplified case of a single marking to market policy is 
studied first and then twice marking to market policy is examined. It is proved that there 
exists an optimal MTM time for minimizing PFE under single and twice marking to 
market policies with timing decision made in simultaneous and sequential manner. Twice 
MTM policies are better in reducing PFE than single MTM policy because the additional 
MTM opportunity. The twice MTM of sequential timing decision is better than that of 
simultaneous timing decision because the second stage timing decision is an optimal 
decision based on future market scenario utilizing new upcoming information. This study 
has important policy implication for contingent credit risk control and lays the foundation 
for the further analysis of the aggregate contingent credit exposure of derivatives 
portfolio taking into account the netting effect.   
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Appendix: Proof of Distribution of the Maximum of Brownian Bridge  
Given  and , (  ) is independent of .  0V xVt = sV ],0[ ts∈ tV
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sample continuity. By the sample continuity and intermediate value theorem, .  
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For each measurable event A, let )|Pr()(Pr BAAb = . Then with respect to , the 
process  has the law of Brownian motion and is independent of 
bPr
ττ VVW hh −= +{ }++ Β∈∩=Β ττ DBDB : , by the strong Markov property.  Let τ−= th . Then h  is a  
measurable random variable, so it is independent of  for .  
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